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INCOME TAX "LOOPHOLES" AND 
POLITICAL RHETORIC 
Boris I. Bittker* 
I. lNTRODUGrION 
DURING the 1972 presidential campaign, federal income tax re-form came unexpectedly to the foreground as a political issue 
in the Democratic primaries and promised for a few weeks to play an 
important role in the election itself. It was soon elbowed aside by the 
prospect of peace in Viet Nam, charges of political espionage and 
corruption, and attacks on the personal attributes of the two candi-
dates, but for a short time it actually succeeded in crowding school 
bussing off the front pages. To the cynic, this might in retrospect 
seem to be the principal accomplishment, if not the purpose, of the 
vivid charges that the Internal Revenue Code is riddled with loop-
holes and that millionaires sometimes pay less in taxes than blue-
collar workers. I am inclined, rather, to believe that these grievances 
continued to smoulder below the surface, like the issue of school 
bussing, even after President Nixon and Senator McGovern turned 
their attention to other questions. 
Moreover, just as hostility to school bussing emanated from a 
variety of sources, so the assault on tax loopholes brought together 
some strange bedfellows. Advocates of a "New Populism" wanted to 
close loopholes in order to strengthen the income tax as a tool of in-
come redistribution. Academic experts, who supplied most of the 
intellectual ammunition for the tax reform movement, wanted to 
purge the income tax of its imperfections primarily to insure "hori-
zontal equity"; for most of them, increased progressivity was only a 
secondary objective, and some were prepared to accept, or even to 
advocate, a less progressive rate structure if that was the legislative 
cost of tax reform. Welfare reformers who wanted to replace today's 
welfare system with a guaranteed-income program thought that their 
proposals could be financed by closing tax loopholes. For still others, 
ta.x loopholes were only symptoms of a worse disease-a federal 
bureaucracy serving the interests of the very rich and the very poor 
but financed by those in between. Their remedy was to cut back 
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federal expenditures, rather than to close the loopholes in order to 
support or increase the offensive programs. 
"Tax reform" could serve as the rallying cry of forces that had 
little else in common because it is irretrievably ambiguous. In aca-
demic circles, to be sure, "income tax reform" almost invariably re-
fers to proposals to expand the tax's coverage, but the term can also 
be used as a label for proposals to narrow its scope or scuttle it en-
tirely. The same ambiguity surrounds the term "social change," 
which candidates for admission to law school like to offer as the mo-
tive that animates their interest in practicing law-with no apparent 
acknowledgement that Vice-President Agnew may be as dedicated to 
social change as they, but in a different direction. 
A similar source of ambiguity is the catchy charge that the federal 
income tax is so full of loopholes that it constitutes a vast "welfare 
program for the rich. "1 Though intended as a call for heavier ta.xes 
on capital gains, state and municipal bond interest, and the oil in-
dustry, this allegation panders to a popular distaste for the "welfare 
mess," whether its beneficiaries are rich or poor. The same rhetorical 
device was employed by President Nixon, but with a better feel for 
public reaction, when he alleged that Senator McGovern's tax re-
form proposals would add 82 million people "to the welfare rolls.''2 
The instrument that was to accomplish this result was the Senator's 
famous $1,000 tax credit or "demogrant," a technical device that he 
was unable to explain in the headlines, but that, unfortunately, he 
could not erase from them either. The very label "demogrant" in-
vited comparison with a welfare grant, and President Nixon can 
hardly be blamed for seizing on the parallelism at a time when tax 
scholars have been asserting that tax allowances, including the basic 
personal and dependency exemptions, are the equivalent of subsidies 
or grants of public funds to the taxpayer.3 
Another example of the coalescence of rhetoric can be seen in the 
allegation by the authors of A Populist Manifesto that the federal 
income tax authorizes "legal larceny,"4 a phrase that is virtually iden-
I. Stern, Uncle Sam's Welfare Program-for the Rich, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1972, 
§ 6 (Magazine), at 28, col. 2. See also P. STERN, THE RAPr: OF THE TAXPAYER (1973). 
2. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1972, at 47, cols. 2-3. 
3. See Heller, Some Observations on the Role and Reform of the Federal Income 
Tax, in 1 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG., 1ST SESs., TAX REvlSION 
COMPENDIUM 181, 190 (Comm. Print 1959); Pfaff &: Pfaff, How Equitable Are Implicit 
Public Grants?, in REDISTRIBUTION To THE RICH AND THE PooR 181 (K. Boulding &: M. 
Pfaff ed. 1972); Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705 
(1970). See also Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 
22 NATL. TAX J. 244 (1969) and articles cited in id. at 244-45 nn.1-4. 
4. J. NEWFIELD &: J. GREENFIELD, A POPULIST MANIFESTO 97 (Warner Paperback 
Library ed. 1972). 
May 1973] Income Tax "Loopholes" 1101 
tical with John Chamberlin's charge, from the right wing, that the 
Sixteenth Amendment "legalizes a theft."5 The targets of the latter-
day populists are the loopholes for the rich, of course, but they do not 
have a copyright on this complaint. A tract calling for repeal of the 
Sixteenth Amendment (appealingly entitled The Income Tax: Root 
of All Evil), for example, also alleges that "pressure groups" are re-
sponsible for "loopholes,"6 that the rich get around the law with the 
aid of "expert accountants,"7 that we now "soak the poor" more than 
the rich,8 and that salvation lies with a coalition of workers, house-
wives, professional people, and small businessmen, since "the big in-
dustrialists, bankers, and commercial interests . . . have no reason to 
favor repeal [of the Sixteenth Amendment]."9 It has even been sug-
gested, in language echoing the argument in Pollock v. Farmers' 
Loan & Trust Company10 (which held the 1894 federal income tax 
unconstitutional and was in turn overruled by the Sixteenth Amend-
ment), that today's income tax is "unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory," and that a "taxpayers' liberation movement" should appeal to 
the courts, since both Congress and the Treasury have turned a deaf 
ear to taxpayers' grievances.11 
Barraged by assertions that the rich have conspired to tax the in-
come of the poor while exempting themselves, the working man may 
conclude that he would prefer a sales tax-a preference that has al-
ready been exhibited by rank-and-file voters in the few states that 
still lack a state income tax. In a 1972 public opinion survey commis-
sioned by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
for example, almost twice (46 per cent versus 25 per cent) as many re-
spondents preferred a state sales tax to a state income tax as a source 
of substantial additional revenue; when asked to name the nation's 
"fairest" tax, they named the state sales tax about as often as the fed-
eral income tax (33 per cent versus 36 per cent), while the state income 
tax was chosen by only 11 per cent of the respondents.12 At the fed-
eral level, this attitude may well lead to enactment of a federal value-
added tax, which would be a national sales tax in disguise-a con-
summation that the new populists would surely deplore. 
5. Chamberlin, Book Review, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 502, 505 (1954). 
6. F. CHODOROV, THE INCOME TAX: ROOT OF ALL EVIL 66-67 (1954). 
7. Id. at 67. 
8. Id. at 51-52. 
9. Id. at 108. 
IO. 157 U.S. 429 (1895). 
II. Halby, Is the Income Tax Unconstitutionally Discriminatory?, 58 A.B.A.J. 1291, 
1292 (1972). 
12. U.S . .ADVISORY CO~IMN. ON INTERGOVERN~!ENTAL RELATIONS, PUBLIC OPINION AND 
TAXES 7-10 (1972). 
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I do not wish by these observations to suggest that critics of the 
Internal Revenue Code should suppress their reformist instincts lest 
they get bitten by dogs that are now sleeping peacefully. Nor would 
I deny the usefulness of political slogans. As Niebuhr has said, "Con-
tending factions in a social struggle require morale; and morale is 
created by the right dogmas, symbols and emotionally potent over-
simplifications."13 The prudent strategist, however, will avoid slo-
gans and rhetoric that can be captured by the enemy and used in a 
successful counterattack. But this is not a manual on political strat-
egy. My purpose, rather, is to examine the "loopholes" that dominate 
the discussion of federal income tax reform. 
When used by newspaper reporters and politicians, the term "ta.x 
loophole" is always a pejorative, though the tone of disapproval may 
be mingled with a dash of admiration for the astute lawyer or ac-
countant who discovered the device. Since condemnation is the pre-
dominant tone, it is always assumed that loopholes can be quickly 
and reliably distinguished from tax provisions that are reasonable 
and fair. Sometimes, to be sure, it is suggested that the only criterion 
is self-interest: one man's loophole is another man's relief provision. 
More frequently, loopholes are said to inure primarily, if not solely, 
to the benefit of the rich, either because high-priced experts must be 
employed to devise loophole-exploiting transactions or because it 
takes capital to consummate the plan after a tax-free route has been 
discovered. Finally, it is often thought that tax loopholes entail an 
enormous loss of potential governmental revenue, and that their 
eradication would either permit everyone else's taxes to be reduced 
or provide the funds for social welfare programs of great magnitude. 
Each of these issues deserves scrutiny. 
II. STATUTORY AMBIGUITIES AND OMISSIONS 
The term "tax loophole" is often used to denote a flaw in the 
language of the Internal Revenue Code or in the Treasury Regula-
tions, discovered by a sharp-eyed lawyer or accountant and exploited 
by his clients. In popular mythology, indeed, the major activity of 
tax experts is the search for divergencies between the letter of the 
law and its spirit, somewhat as W. C. Fields described his purpose in 
reading the Bible: "Looking for loopholes, of course, looking for 
loopholes." This usage accords with the Oxford English Dictionary's 
definition of "loophole" as "an ambiguity or omission in a statute, 
etc., which affords opportunity for evading its intention."14 Result-
13. R. NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY XV (1948). 
14. 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 433 (1933). There is, of course, a vast body 
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ing by hypothesis from a legislative error, a loophole in this sense is 
likely to be corrected by Congress once it comes to public attention; 
the phrase "notorious loophole" is thus either a contradiction in 
terms or a transitory phenomenon. When discovered by a tax expert, 
therefore, a loophole is a wasting asset that he must exploit quickly 
but warily. His clientele must be informed of his discovery if he is to 
reap a financial benefit from it, but when he exposes it to view, he 
reduces its life expectancy by stimulating Congress to enact correc-
tive legislation. His dilemma resembles that of the archeologist 
whose excavation brings an ancient fresco to light but simulta-
neously exposes it to the destructive forces of nature. 
For its part, the Treasury must also make a difficult decision 
when it discovers a loophole. A request for corrective legislation will 
call attention to the statutory imperfection and stimulate taxpayers 
to exploit it in the interim, but if the Treasury seeks to discourage 
such attempts by announcing that the ambiguity or omission is more 
apparent than real and hence should not be relied on by taxpayers, 
Congress may refuse to take action on the ground that the need for 
legislation has not yet been demonstrated. A leading tax publication, 
for example, once announced that "for months ... the tax fraternity 
has been aware that the Treasury had a list of loopholes in the law 
that it considered too hot to release, for fear of encouraging tax-
payers to flock to use these tax-saving devices."115 
Loopholes of this type-statutory ambiguities and omissions so 
clearly in conflict with the intent of the legislature16 that prompt 
correction can be expected as soon as they come to light-are, in my 
opinion, not very common. One example ( chosen because it is not 
excessively technical) is a 1954 provision17 that permitted the tax-
payer to take a dependency deduction for a member of his household 
whose principal place of abode was the taxpayer's home, even if the 
dependent was not related to the taxpayer by blood, marriage, or 
adoption-relationships that had previously been indispensible to a 
dependency exemption. Intended by Congress to permit foster chil-
of case law and commentary on legislative "intent," "purpose," and "motive," and the 
view that these are fictional concepts is less prevalent than it was two decades ago. 
See J. CoHEN, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LEGISLATION 35-186 (2d ed. 1967); A. LENHOFF, 
COMMENTS, CAsF.S AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 577-85, 787-854 (1949). 
15. 28 of Treasury's Famous Secret Loopholes and Hardships Revealed by Ways 0' 
Means Committee, 5 J. TAXATION 322 (1956). See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON IN-
TERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS. &: STAFF OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT, 
Ltsr OF SUBsrANTIVE UNINTENDED BENEFITS AND HARDSHIPS AND ADDmoNAL PROBLEMS 
FOR THE TECHNICAL .AMENDMENTS Acr BILL OF 1957 (1956); Technical Amendments Act 
of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606. 
16. See text accompanying note 14 supra. 
17. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(a)(9). 
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dren to qualify as dependents, the language of the new provision 
held out the tantalizing possibility that the taxpayer could deduct 
$600 a year for the cost of supporting a mistress or kept man. Before 
this incentive to what would now be called an alternative life style 
got very far, however, the courts shot it down. Invoking "the well 
settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible construction, so as 
to effectuate the legislative intention and, if possible, avoid an ab-
surd conclusion," the Tax Court held: 
In our opinion Congress never intended the specific paragraph in 
question to be construed so literally as to permit a dependency 
exemption for an individual whom the taxpayer is maintaining in 
an illicit relationship in conscious violation of the criminal law of 
the jurisdiction of his abode. 
We are of the opinion that to so construe the statute would in 
effect ascribe to the Congress an intent to countenance, if not to aid 
and encourage, a condition not only universally regarded as against 
good public morals, but also constituting a continuing, willful, open, 
and deliberate violation of the laws of the State of Alabama. . . . 
This we are unable to do.18 
The Tax Court's surmise about the legislative intent was subse-
quently confirmed by Congress, which amended the Code in 1958 
to provide explicitly in section 152(b)(5) that a person whose rela-
tionship to the taxpayer violates local law is not to be treated as "a 
member of the taxpayer's household." Recommending enactment of 
this language, the Senate Finance Committee described it as declara-
tory of the law ("[I]t is made clear that .... ")19 rather than as a sub-
stantive change, and provided that it would be retroactively effective 
as of 1954, when the ambiguous provision creating the problem en-
tered the Code.20 Along with this clarification of the law, Congress 
closed another loophole in section 152(a)(9) by amending it to pro-
vide that the taxpayer may not claim his spouse as a dependent, since 
such a deduction (although arguably sanctioned by the original lan-
guage of this provision21) would ordinarily duplicate a deduction for 
the taxpayer's spouse that was already authorized by another provi-
sion of the Code (section 151). Here again, Congress denied that it 
was making a substantive change, asserting instead that the legisla-
tion was intended only "[t]o make it clear that [the loophole] was 
18. Turnipseed v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 758, 760-61 (1957). 
19. S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1958). 
20. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, § 152(a)(9), 68A Stat. 43 (codified at INT. REv. 
CODE OF 1954, § 152(a)(9)). 
21. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, § 152(a)(9), 68A Stat. 43. 
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not at any time intended" and reinforcing this explanation by pro-
viding that the new language was to be applied retroactively.22 
For another example of a loophole arising from inept draftsman-
ship, I turn to the Connecticut tax on capital gains, which, after ex-
empting $2,000 of such gains in specified circumstances, goes on to 
provide that the $2,000 exemption is to be multiplied by a fraction, 
the numerator and denominator of which are then described in 
terms not here relevant.23 The legislative purpose was to reduce the 
$2,000 exemption to a lesser amount or even to zero in certain cir-
cumstances. But the draftsman forgot, or perhaps never knew, that a 
fraction can be greater than 1/1, as well as smaller. By failing to pro-
vide that the exemption might in no case exceed $2,000, he opened 
the door to an exemption of many times that amount-indeed, to an 
exemption of unlimited amount-when the statutory fraction ex-
ceeds I/ I. Another case of inadvertance-also drawn from the Con-
necticut statute books-is the inadvertent omission of the word 
"not" from a provision defining the term "resident" for tax pur-
poses. 24 
In cases like these, the courts often come to the rescue by holding 
that the letter of the law is not controlling, and that the legislative 
purpose-gleaned from the statute's history or context, or inferred 
by comparing the practical consequences of the competing interpre-
tations-must prevail over the scrivener's deficiency. A 1940 opinion 
of the United States Supreme Court describes this process succinctly: 
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose 
of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to 
give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and 
of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such 
cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has 
led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond 
the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when 
the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely an 
unreasonable one "plainly at variance with the policy of the legisla-
22, S. REP. No. 1983, supra note 19, at 15. This action in effect endorsed a prior 
judicial decision refusing to permit a deduction for the spouse under section 152(a)(9), 
despite its language, because the over-all statutory scheme when illuminated by its 
legislative history showed "that it was not the intention of the Congress to grant an 
additional exemption" for a dependent spouse. Dewsbury v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 
467, 469 (Ct. Cl. 1956). See also REv. Rul. 55-325, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 18. 
23. CONN. GEN, STAT • .ANN. § 12-506(c)(l) (1972). 
24. No. 5, § l(b)(l), [1971] Conn. Pub. Acts June Spec. Sess. 2173, from which 
the bracketed word was omitted: "or who is [not] domiciled in this state but ••• " The 
error became a matter of only academic interest when the entire act was repealed, 
later in the same session, by No. 8, § I, [1971] Conn. Pub. Acts June Spec. Sess. 2245. 
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tion as a whole" this Court has followed that purpose, rather than 
the literal words.25 
This approach is well illustrated by the Tax Court's comments in 
the dependency exemption case, summarized above, to which numer-
ous other examples could be added. 
The courts are not always this candid in admitting that the words 
are being twisted a little to get at the substance lying below the sur-
face. In Helvering v. Owens,26 for example, the Supreme Court had 
to pass on the amount to be deducted as a casualty loss when the tax-
payer's automobile was slightly damaged in a collision. He had paid 
about $1,800 for the car, but it was worth only $225 before and $190 
after the accident. Although only $35 of damage was attributable to 
the collision, the statutory language seemed clearly to permit the 
taxpayer to deduct the difference between the car's original cost and 
its value after the accident, or over $1,600 on these facts. The Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit so decided, in a per curiam opinion 
bearing every indication of Judge Learned Hand's authorship: 
"[T]he letter is too plain; we should have to disregard the words, and 
should not be interpreting them, if we refused to take them just as 
they read."27 In a substantially identical case, however, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit parted company with Judge Hand, 
asserting that "it is not reasonable to suppose that Congress intended 
to permit [a] deduction in excess of actual loss" and that "the statute 
should be construed as containing such exception[s] where necessary 
to avoid a consequence which Congress clearly did not intend."28 
The Supreme Court, reviewing both cases,29 endorsed the Fourth 
Circuit's reading of the statute but buried the issue in a cloud of 
verbiage rather than admitting that it was stretching the statutory 
language. This should not, however, obscure the Court's implicit 
determination to reach an eminently sensible result despite the 
draftsman's ineptitude. 
Since loopholes, as I have been using the term, depend for their 
existence on a judicial willingness to elevate the letter of the law over 
its substance, the kind of judicial activism just described promises 
to turn the loophole into an extinct art form. I do not mean to assert 
that the courts are never willing to enforce a badly drafted statute as 
25. United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
26. 305 U.S. 468 (1939). 
27. Helvering v. Owens, 95 F.2d 318, 319 (2d Cir. 1938). 
28. Helvering v. Obici, 97 F.2d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 1938). 
29. Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939), afjg. 97 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1938) and 
revg. 95 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1938). 
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written, or that it is already as difficult for a taxpayer to escape 
through a loophole as it is for a camel to squeeze through the eye of 
a needle. Judge Learned Hand's refusal in the Owens case to ride 
roughshod over the statutory language was reversed by the Supreme 
Court, but that does not mean that every statutory deficiency is 
corrected. It is an old chestnut that maxims of statutory construction 
come in opposing pairs, and occasionally a pair will emanate from 
the same author. Thus, the same Holmes who warned his fellow 
judges that "if [the legislature] has intimated its will, however in-
directly, that will should be recognized and obeyed"30 also said, "We 
[judges] do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what 
the statute means."31 For loopholes to survive, the latter attitude 
must prevail. 
Lacking a more systematic study of this question, I offer the 
hypothesis that loopholes conforming to the Oxford English Dic-
tionary definition quoted earlier32 ("an ambiguity or omission in a 
statute, etc., which affords opportunity for evading its intention") are 
comparatively rare. The quality of legislative drafting in the federal 
tax field is unusually high, the Internal Revenue Code is subject to 
frequent revision, and I know of no area of the law in which the 
courts are more likely to search for the legislative purpose and prefer 
it, whenever it can be discerned, to a literal construction of the 
statutory language. Of course, ambiguities in the tax law are some-
times resolved in the taxpayer's favor when the legislative intent is 
debatable, but by hypothesis these are not cases in which the legisla-
tive intent has been disregarded, however critical one may be of the 
substantive outcome. 
Even if I overestimate the level of judicial activism, and thus 
underestimate the number of loopholes resulting from drafting in-
eptitudes that survive judicial scrutiny, it should be noted that 
taxpayers will continue to escape through loopholes only if Congress 
fails to take corrective action. If Congress fails to overrule a decision 
because it is content with the law as judicially interpreted, the loop-
hole is converted into a legislatively sanctioned tax allowance. If the 
decision is allowed to stand only because Congress is too busy with 
other matters, the result can be regarded as a loophole-by-inertia. 
But the taxpayer who uses such an escape hatch is not so much ex-
ploiting a draftsman's error that frustrates the intent of the legisla-
30. Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908) CTustice Holmes on cir-
cuit). 
31. 0. Hou.ms, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920). 
32. See text accompanying note 14 supra. 
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ture as he is benefitting from Congressional inattention or indiffer-
ence. A collector of unblemished specimens will not value a loop-
hole-by-inertia as highly as a statutory mistake that has not yet been 
described in the literature and is so clearly at odds with the Congres-
sional intent that it will almost certainly evoke an amendment when 
it comes to public attention. 
I do not want to make too much of these paradoxes, or to assert 
that there are no "unintended benefits"33 in the Internal Revenue 
Code. No doubt it contains some loopholes in the classic sense-
statutory errors that well-advised taxpayers are exploiting without 
the knowledge of Congress or the Treasury. No doubt some of these 
unintended benefits will be sustained by the courts, despite the 
professed judicial reluctance to allow taxpayers to make a fortress of 
the dictionary. No doubt some of these judicial victories will enable 
still other taxpayers to exploit the same mistakes because of congres-
sional inertia. 
When all is said and done, however, these are not the "loopholes" 
under attack. The major targets of income tax reformers are such 
statutory provisions as the exclusion of state and municipal bond 
interest from taxable income, percentage depletion, the reduced tax 
rate on long-term capital gains, and the deductions for local taxes, 
mortgage interest, and charitable contributions. These allowances 
have not been brought to light by the diligent burrowing of astute 
and highly paid tax experts seeking to frustrate the objectives of 
Congress. Sometimes, to be sure, tax scholars seek to enliven their 
prose with suggestions to the contrary. Thus, a recent study of 
"those hidden subsidies termed implicit public grants"34' promises to 
lead us through "the jungle of provisions that convey special advan-
tages only to the legal wizard or to the individual wealthy enough to 
obtain the services of a legal expert or to the person adept at manip-
ulating potential sources of income in order to conform to some 
obscure section in the tax law."35 But a conducted tour through this 
vividly portrayed "jungle" will disappoint the venturesome reader. 
Nothing more exotic will be encountered on his safari than an ex-
pensive but familiar flock of domesticated animals, of which the most 
prominent are the joint return for married couples, the personal and 
dependency exemptions, and the deductibility of charitable contri-
butions, interest, and taxes. Far from being reserved for "legal 
wizards," these provisions satisfy Gibbon's description of a late 
33. See note 15 supra. 
34. Pfaff &: Pfaff, supra note 3, at 181. 
35. Id. at 183. 
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Roman emperor's collection of manuscripts and concubines: "The 
one, as the other, was intended rather for use than ostentation." If 
the man in the street does not already know about these tax benefits, 
he can fill this gap in his knowledge by reading the Treasury's free 
publications or paying $5 to a store-front tax "consultant." 
III. TAX AVOIDANCE TACTICS 
In popular usage, the term "loophole" often also reflects the 
widely held view that tax experts have a magical power to reduce 
tax.es, primarily for the rich, by paperwork that has no other visible 
consequences. If Smith makes a series of lifetime gifts to his children 
in order to save death tax.es by removing the property from his tax.-
able estate, for example, the transfers may seem devoid of practical 
consequences because the Smiths are bound together by ties of 
affection that transcend their legal rights. Yet King Lear learned that 
family loyalties may dissolve, and even the layman who thinks that 
the gifts just described are nothing more than tax gimmicks might 
well balk if the Internal Revenue Code required him to include his 
teenage children's earnings when computing his tax.able income. 
While something can be said for disregarding legal rights within the 
family, there is also much to be said for treating individuals as dis-
crete units; debatable judgments are unavoidable in such an area. 
The concept of "family" implies a definition that includes some of 
the taxpayer's relatives and excludes others; no one would propose 
taxing the "family of man" as a single unit. Conversely, however, 
few are so committed to individualism as to propose that family ties 
be wholly disregarded in computing the individual's tax liability. 
The tax advantages that are inevitably conferred on taxpayers who 
find themselves on the tax-free side of the fence, or who get there by 
arranging their affairs to satisfy the law, may be called "loopholes" 
by the layman. So used, however, the term simply expresses disap-
proval of the rules; any implication that the legislative intent is 
being frustrated is unwarranted. 
But the expert sometimes engages in another type of paperwork, 
similarly criticized but simultaneously admired by the layman as a 
species of black magic, where the implication of a conflict with the 
legislative intent may be better founded. I refer to transactions that 
are designed to fit within one statutory compartment rather than 
another but whose practical consequences are otherwise transitory. 
A taxpayer, for example, is about to sell some appreciated property 
with the intention of making a gift of the proceeds to his children; 
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on consulting his attorney or accountant, he is advised to give the 
property itself to the children and let them make the sale, in order 
to take advantage of the fact that a donor of appreciated property is 
not taxed on his unrealized gain when he transfers it by gift. His hope, 
therefore, is that the gain will be taxed to the children, who may be 
subject to a lower tax rate. In such a case, and in many others that 
could be added to the list, the anticipated tax advantage derives from 
the fact that the Internal Revenue Code, despite its awesome detail, 
contains many provisions of such disarming simplicity as to invite 
manipulation. The~e is nothing in the Code determining whether 
the transaction should be taxed as a sale of property by the taxpayer 
followed by a gift of the proceeds by him to the children, or as a gift 
of the property to the children followed by a sale of the property by 
them. As a result, the courts must decide how the transaction is to be 
treated for tax purposes. 
Manoeuvres as transparent as these are rarely successful, but 
when a bit more time elapses between one step in the transaction 
and another, they may get by. If so, is the taxpayer exploiting a 
loophole of the type discussed above, viz., a statutory ambiguity or 
omission that serves to frustrate the legislative intent? There are, 
undoubtedly, taxpayer successes that one can confidently say would 
have been disapproved if the issue had been exposed when the legis-
lation was before the Congress. More frequently, however, a remedy 
would have been so complex that no clear legislative intent can be 
reconstructed from the materials at hand. 
In my gift-sale case, for example, a legislative body that wished to 
establish a statutory rule might draw the line by establishing an 
arbitrary time limit (e.g., 30 days) and providing that any sale within 
that time by the donee should be imputed to the donor. A more re-
stricted statutory remedy might tax the donor only if the donee is a 
minor child. Or the donor might be taxed only if the donee sells the 
property to a buyer with whom the donor had negotiated, only if 
the terms of the sale had been prearranged, or only if the value of 
the property or the tax differential between donor and donee exceeds 
a specified amount. Another approach would be a statutory presump-
tion that the donee acted under the donor's influence, with an oppor-
tunity to prove instead that the donee made an independent decision 
to sell the property rather than keep it. When the choice of statutory 
remedies is as wide as this, it is impossible to say with any assurance 
that the disputed issue would have been resolved in one way rather 
than another by the legislature. 
In point of fact, the courts are quite unsympathetic to avoidance 
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tactics of this type. This is not the place to describe in detail the 
judicial doctrines that are regularly invoked to deflate ingenious and 
initially promising schemes, but the labels-"business purpose," 
"sham or camouflage," "step transactions," "form vs. substance," and 
the like-convey their flavor.36 Suffice it to say that the courts are 
quite ready in tax cases to probe beneath the surface before accepting 
a transaction at face value. An acerbic comment by Chief Judge 
John R. Brown of the fifth circuit court of appeals can stand as a 
summary of this attitude. Refusing to allow the taxpayers in a com-
plex transaction to hide behind a facade entailing the use of an 
attorney named W. R. Deal as an intermediary, he said: "The Deal 
deal was not the real deal. That ends it."37 
In point of fact, the layman is far more inclined than the expert 
to trust paperwork as a shield against tax liability. One is bombarded 
at cocktail parties with tax schemes that would not convince the most 
inexperienced revenue agent or that teeter on the brink of fraud, 
but which are offered as proof positive of the speaker's astute sophis-
tication. Randolph Paul's comments on this subject twenty years ago 
cannot be improved: 
Above all things, a tax attorney must be an indefatigable skeptic; 
he must discount everything he hears and reads. The market place 
abounds with unsound avoidance schemes which will not stand the 
test of objective analysis and litigation. The escaped tax, a favorite 
topic of conversation at the best clubs and the most sumptuous 
pleasure resorts, expands with repetition into fantastic legends. 
But clients want opinions with happy endings, and he smiles best 
who smiles last. It is wiser to state misgivings at the beginning than 
to have to acknowledge them ungracefully at the end. The tax 
adviser has, therefore, to spend a large part of his time advising 
against schemes of this character. I sometimes think that the most 
important word in his vocabulary is "No" .... as 
But not all tax experts are "indefatigable skeptics," and even 
those who are can sometimes be persuaded by their clients to try a 
tax avoidance scheme, especially if the only penalty for failure is the 
tax that would have been due and payable if the transaction had 
taken its normal course. (The deficiency in case of failure must be 
paid with interest, but the 6 per cent interest may be less than the 
value of the money to the taxpayer in the interim, and it is in any 
event deductible.) And these plans sometimes succeed. 
36. See generally B. BllTKER &: J. EUS'l'ICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA· 
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1-19 to -20 (3d ed. 1971) and articles cited therein. 
37. Blueberry Land Co. v. Commissioner, 361 F.2d 93, 102 (5th Cir. 1966). 
38. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 RocKY MT. L. REv. 412, 416 (1953). 
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The layman, then, is right in thinking that business transactions 
are frequently cast in a particular form for no reason other than tax 
avoidance, that the paperwork may create a distinction without a 
difference, and that these formalities often succeed. Indeed, the 
paperwork may take the taxpayer through a tax-free route that was 
explicitly endorsed by Congress as an alternative to another route 
that is taxable. Many other tax avoidance transactions are feasible 
only because Congress has failed to enact a safeguard against them. 
Congressional inaction may reflect a judgment that the area is unim-
portant, that administrative and judicial scrutiny is preferable to a 
legislative solution, or that a satisfactory legislative remedy would be 
too complex; or it may stem from an unresolved difference of opin-
ion within Congress or between Congress and the Treasury about 
the best remedy to be adopted or even about whether there is a 
defect to be remedied. Still other tax avoidance transactions are in 
fact vulnerable, but nevertheless escape the attention of the revenue 
agent if and when the return is audited. The army may have a 
"smart" missile that can find an airplane despite its evasive tactics, 
but the Internal Revenue Service has no mechanical device to unveil 
"the real deal" (to borrow Judge Brown's phrase), and its enforce-
ment budget is scandalously low. 
There is no harm in applying the term "loophole" to tax avoid-
ance opportunities of the type just described, provided one does not 
infer from this label that they are caused by flaws in the statutory 
language that will be corrected as soon as they come to the attention 
of Congress. Moreover, however fertile this area may be as a breeding 
ground for "loopholes" in the layman's sense, it is not a major target 
of income tax reform, except to the extent that changes in the basic 
tax rules (e.g., in the treatment of capital gains) may reduce the 
opportunity for tax "planning" and "manipulation." 
IV. "EROSION," "PREFERENCES," AND OTHER EUPHEMISMS 
Academic proponents of income tax reform have long been 
aware of the confusion generated by applying the term "loophole" 
to the major targets of their endeavors. To imply, even by a label, 
that they are merely exposing a series of unintended tax benefits 
attributable to sloppy draftsmanship belittles their crusade. It also 
invites a countercharge of naivete, since the provisions in question 
were enacted deliberately rather than by inadvertence, and, though 
the results may differ from the legislative expectation, a congressional 
failure to amend or repeal the provisions is more likely to reflect 
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legislative approval or a political stalemate than ignorance. Tax 
reformers, therefore, have searched for a more accurate term than 
"loophole" to characterize the objects of their criticism. 
A veritable thesaurus of alternative labels has come into vogue 
in the last two decades; the most common are "exceptions," "prefer-
ences," "special privileges," "tax expenditure," and "erosion."39 By 
implying that the tax benefits to which they are applied were pur-
posefully enacted by Congress, these terms reject the aura of inad-
vertence and secrecy that emanates from the term "loophole." This, 
in turn, implicitly acknowledges that repeal of these provisions will 
not automatically follow their exposure to the light, the fate that 
might be hypothesized for a loophole of the classical variety. Thus, a 
label like "preference" or "special privilege" has the virtue of politi-
cal realism, suggesting that the allowance was enacted to serve an 
economic interest, that it is backed by political muscle, and that it 
will not be relinquished without a legislative battle. 
Tax commentators sometimes substitute these terms for "tax 
loopholes" to avoid its pejorative connotation, so that the tax benefit 
in question can be examined on its individual merits, without pre-
judgment. But this objective is rarely achieved. However impartial 
the writer's intent, the new label usually starts with or quickly 
acquires an aura of disapproval. "Erosion" can be a good thing, of 
course-it brought fertility to the Nile Valley and beauty to the 
Grand Canyon-but ordinarily it is no more welcome than an in-
vasion of termites. As for "special privileges," they are occasionally 
praised-lifetime tenure for federal judges is an example-but most 
"privileges," particularly "special" ones, evoke enthusiastic denun-
ciation. The term "tax expenditures" purports to be value-free, but 
it grows out of a theory that the direct appropriations process is 
presumptively a better way to confer the benefits that are embedded 
in the Internal Revenue Code, and it cannot escape the pejorative 
flavor that is unmistakably intended by its twin, "back-door spend-
ing."40 An "exception" to a rule sometimes implies tolerance or 
benevolence, but more often it suggests an impropriety, unless justi-
fication is affirmatively proved; we like to think that laws should be 
enforced without fear or favor. 
What is perhaps most notable is that none of these substitutes 
for the term "loophole" implies a favorable attitude. The tax pro-
39. See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967). 
40. Heller, supra note 3, at 190 ("The back door to government subsidies marked 
'tax relief' •••• "). See also Surrey, supra note 3. 
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visions in question are not described as "refinements of the tax base," 
as attempts to "fine-tune" the Internal Revenue Code, or as examples 
of tempering justice with mercy. The alternative labels are, in short, 
euphemisms for their predecessor. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that studies by experts of tax 
"erosion," "preferences," and the like are regularly reported in the 
press under the generic title "loopholes." By itself, this stretching of 
labels would not matter. Headline writers are not expected to be 
lexicographers. But when the popular conception of "tax loopholes" 
-gimmicks that are invented by crafty lawyers for the very rich-is 
carried over to the provisions that the expert describes as "tax ex-
penditures" or "preferences," a monumentally false impression is 
created. 
A good example of this pervasive practice is a summary subtitle 
in a recent article in the New York Times Magazine which portrays 
"the average American taxpayer" as suffering the pains of flood and 
shipwreck, while the federal government dispenses "a bountiful $77-
billion in 'tax welfare' each year" to "a happy few."41 Michael 
Harrington has used almost identical language to denounce the 
Internal Revenue Code: "The unconscionable fact is that the In-
ternal Revenue Code is a perverse welfare system that hands out $77 
billion a year, primarily to the rich."42 These allegations and others 
like them are based on a statistical study of a wide range of tax 
allowances, published by the Joint Economic Committee in 1972. 
The authors are Joseph Pechman and Benjamin Okner, of the 
Brookings Institution, whose eminence as tax economists is exploited 
by the new populists to support their claim that the federal income 
tax dispenses $77 billion of "tax welfare" to the rich. The carefully 
detailed Pechman-Okner study, however, tells a more complex and 
less lurid story. It shows that more than half of the $77 billion in tax 
allowances goes to taxpayers with income from $5,000 to $25,000, and 
that if these provisions were repealed, almost 5 million families with 
income of less than $5,000 and about the same number with income 
of $5,000 to $10,000 who now pay no income taxes would be added 
to the tax rolls.43 The "happy few" who profit from "erosion" of the 
41. Stern, supra note I, at 28. Although the author refers at several points to 
"loopholes for the many," the central message of the article was satisfactorily sum-
marized by the editorial captions. 
42. Harrington, Ideally We Should Abolish Every Subsidy in the Internal Revenue 
Code, SAT. REv., Oct. 21, 1972, at 49. 
43. Pechman &: Okner, Individual Income Tax Erosion by Income Classes, in JOINT 
ECONOMIC CoMMJ.'ITEE, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PRO• 
GRAMS, pt. 1, at 27 (table 8) (Comm. Print 1972), reprinted in Pechman &: Okner, Indi-
vidual Income Tax Erosion by Income Classes (Brookings Institution Reprint No. 230, 
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tax base, it turns out, are 70.5 million families-not just Middle and 
Upper America but most of Lower America as well.44 
Pechman himself, unlike some who purport to build on his work, 
has made this crystal clear, pointing out "that there are loopholes 
for persons at all income levels" and describing the income tax as 
"the best tax we have."45 Testifying before the House Committee on 
Ways and Means in January of 1973, Pechman said that "a great 
deal can be done-short of comprehensive reform-to improve the 
progressivity of the income tax" and offered a choice of three reform 
programs, which would produce revenue increases of $3.1 billion to 
$10.2 billion.46 If the Pechman-Okner study demonstrated that the 
federal income tax is a $77 billion welfare program for the rich, it 
is hardly to be supposed that Pechman would have associated himself 
-even as a last resort in a poor year for tax reform-with a program 
that would leave $74 of the $77 billion unscathed. 
A similar disparity between expert and popular conceptions of 
tax loopholes may be found in A Populist Manifesto, which speaks of 
$50 billion of tax "subsidies to the wealthy," describing them as 
"outrages legislated into the tax code" that "not a senator or congress-
man would have the chutzpah to vote for" if they were treated as 
subsidies.47 The authors then call for reforms to "close all of the 
loopholes in our tax law," because otherwise "the tax-dodgers and 
their advisers will simply move capital from one shelter to another."48 
But they refrain from listing the $50 billion of "subsidies to the 
wealthy" that they nominate for wholesale extinction, and the un-
published study on which they rely discloses that the statutory "out-
rages" include substantially the same items that the Pechman-Okner 
study detailed, except for the tax benefits conferred on married 
couples by the joint return.49 (The fact that the major "tax welfare" 
1972). Because this study uses a broader concept of income ("expanded adjusted gross 
income") than existing law, many families move up the income ladder when classified 
by income class in the study. 
44. Id. 
45. Pechman, The Rich, the Poor, and the Taxes They Pay, THE PUBLIC !NTERESI', 
Fall 1969, at 21, reprinted in 115 CoNG, REc. 32361 (1969). 
46. Hearings on General Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways o- Means, 
9lld Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 149 (197ll). 
47. J. NEWFIELD&: J. GREENFIELD, supra note 4, at 100. 
48. Id. at 105 (emphasis original). 
49. Id. at 100. The "tax expenditure" list on which they rely is substantially iden-
tical with the one published in Surrey, supra note 3, at 709-11. A later version may 
be found in HOUSE COMMI1TEE ON WAYS &: MEANS, 92D CONG., 2D SEss., ESTIMATES OF 
FEDERAL TAX ExPENDITURES 4-5 (Comm. Print 1972). For criticism of the tax expendi-
ture budget, see Bittker, supra note ll; Surrey &: Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure 
Budget-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NATL, TAX J. 528 (1969); Bittker, The Tax 
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lists can be separated by about $25 billion, attributable to disagree-
ment over the classification of one item, should suggest to the reader 
that both may reflect a variety of other debatable judgments, espe-
cially since a third list, with overlapping populist sponsorship, re-
duces the amount of "welfare to the rich" by another $25 billion.)150 
An even more heated-but no less misleading-denunciation of tax 
loopholes may be found in a discussion of white-collar crime by a 
professor of sociology, who accepts an earlier author's assertion that 
"honest payment by everybody liable to income tax would enable the 
government to decrease the general tax burden by 40 per cent," and 
then goes on to tell us that this figure "suggests rather graphically 
the largely unrecognized or passed over, yet very real, cost to the 
individual citizen of tax crimes."51 
This extraordinary confusion results from the fact that the tax 
expert's conception of "preferences," "tax expenditures," and the 
like embraces many provisions that are so familiar and widespread 
that taxpayers often think of them as normal, if not essential, features 
of an income tax law. Thus, the largest single component of the $77 
billion of "tax welfare" that goes to the "happy few" is the rate 
advantage granted to married couples who file joint returns and the 
similar concessions to heads of households, to widows and widowers 
with minor children, and (since 1969) to unmarried persons.152 The 
only taxpayers who do not benefit from these provisions (which 
account for $21.6 billion of the $77 billion of "tax welfare")53 are 
Expenditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellmuth, 22 NATL. TAX J. 
538 (1969). 
50. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1973, § 4 at 18, col. 1 (advertisement for Tax Action 
Campaign, described as "a project of New Populist Action"). Since the estimated $25 
billion evidently embraces the corporate income tax as well as the individual income 
tax, the latter's contribution to the rich must be substantially less than $25 billion. 
51. F. SCHUR, OUR CRIMINAL SoCIETY 165 (1969), referring to a statistical study 
described in F. GIBNEY, THE OPERATORS (1960). Professor Schur seems to think that the 
"tax crimes" which prevent the tax burden from being reduced by 40 per cent are 
committed primarily by business executives and large corporations, although the cal-
culations (which Mr. Gibney advises me were given to him "by people connected with 
the I.R.S., who were, however, unwilling to be quoted as their source'1 must have 
been based on a tax reform program affecting tens of millions of taxpayers. (This 
emerges from Mr. Gibney's own statement that the amount of tax successfully evaded 
is about $5 billion, a figure that would not permit the "general tax burden" to be 
reduced by anything like 40 per cent. Id. at 200.) In point of fact, both Gibney and 
Schur have evidently confused a reduction in tax rates with a reduction in the tax 
burden. A rate reducton made possible by expanding the tax base, which is the only 
plausible basis for Gibney's figure of 40 per cent, would of course leave the aggregate 
burden unchanged, so that some taxpayers would pay more and others less-the same 
result that would be produced by the Pechman-Okner proposal, see text accompanying 
notes 65-69 infra, to expand the base and lower the rates. 
52. Pechman & Okner, supra note 43, at 33-34 (tables A-1, A-2). 
53. Id. at 33 (table A-1). 
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married persons filing separate returns, who constitute less than 4 
per cent of the taxpaying population.54 The next largest component 
in the Pechman-Okner computation, making up $14.2 billion55 of 
the $77 billion total, reflects revenue to be raised by restricting the 
itemized deductions for such items as state and local taxes, medical 
expenses, and charitable contributions, substituting a flat $1,300 low 
income allowance56 for the existing standard deduction, and repeal-
ing the extra $750 personal exemption for persons who are over 65 
or blind. The third major item ($13 billion of $77 billion)57 would 
result from the taxation of transfer payments-social security, wel-
fare, workmen's compensation, unemployment benefits, and veterans' 
disability payments. Other important provisions that would be re-
pealed or restricted by the Pechman-Okner proposals are the deduc-
tions for real property taxes and mortgage interest on personal 
residences and the exclusion of interest on life insurance policies. 
Although all of these tax advantages are enjoyed to some extent 
by high income taxpayers, they accrue primarily to taxpayers in the 
low and middle income brackets, and these are the taxpayers whose 
aggregate tax liability would be most severely increased by their 
repeal.58 The only tax provisions of comparable fiscal importance 
that are monopolized by high income taxpayers (i.e., those with in-
comes of $50,000 or more) are the capital gains rules (including the 
failure to tax appreciation on gifts and bequests), accounting for 
$13.7 billion of the $77 billion.69 High income taxpayers are also the 
principal beneficiaries of tax-exempt interest, accelerated deprecia-
tion, and percentage depletion, but the aggregate dollar value of 
these allowances ($1.7 billion) is minor when compared with the 
items described above. 00 
Thus, tax erosion and tax preferences are as democratic as envi-
ronmental pollution: you don't have to be rich to throw a plastic 
beer can under a bridge, or to exclude social security benefits from 
your federal income tax return. Middle America may be fed up with 
54. 1969 IRS, STATISTICS OF INCOME, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETuRNs 4 (table IC) 
(2.1 million taxable returns out of 63.7 million). By classifying the 1969 rate reduction 
for unmarried taxpayers as erosion, along with the joint rate applicable to married 
couples, the Pechman-Okner study, Pechman & Okner, supra note 43, at 21 n.24, implies 
that there was less erosion before 1969, when the ta.x distance between married and 
unmarried taxpayers was greater. 
55. Pechman & Okner, supra note 43, at 34 (table A-2). 
56. Id. at 17. 
57. Id. at 34 (table A-2). 
58. Id. at 33 (table A-1). 
59. Id. at 34 (table A-2). 
60. Id. at 23 (table 3). 
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tax loopholes, as we are often told by social commentators who 
perceive a taxpayer revolt in their crystal balls, but only a small 
fraction of the $77 billion "tax welfare" program is the target of 
popular outcry. Moreover, if these provisions were repealed, only 
14. 7 per cent of the $77 billion yield would come from families with 
income over $100,000 and 9.6 per cent from those with income from 
$50,000 to $100,000.61 Another 22.5 per cent would come from ta.'l{-
payers with $25,000 to $50,000 of income-a group that, however 
well off, can hardly be classed with the Mellons and Rockefellers but 
whose present tax liability would have to be nearly doubled to raise 
their share of the target. 62 This leaves more than half of the $77 
billion to be collected from taxpayers with income below $25,000. 
Thus, analysis of the Pechman-Okner tax erosion study is a sobering 
experience. The exhilarating soak-the-rich recommendations that 
have been attached to it reflect the emotive power of the term 
"erosion," not the facts in the computer printouts. 
To rebut this gloomy suggestion, it may be argued that aggregate 
figures are misleading. Even though half of the $77 billion of new 
revenue that could be raised by applying current rates to an ex-
panded reformed tax base would come from taxpayers with $5,000 
to $25,000 of income and only about 15 per cent from those with 
incomes over $100,000, the per capita effect of tax reform would be 
very different. The average tax increase for a family with $100,000 
to $500,000 of income would be about $40,000, while the average 
taxpayer at the bottom of the heap would pay only a few dollars 
more than he does now. 63 The fact that comprehensive expansion of 
the tax base will cost individual rich men far more than individual 
poor men (so that the big loopholes are at the top),64 however, will 
not guarantee its popularity among the citizenry at large. However 
small, an increased per capita burden on low and middle income 
taxpayers can be painful; the last dollar may have a marginal utility 
to them that equals or is greater than the marginal utility of the rich 
man's last thousand dollars. In any event, if the issue is whether 
comprehensive tax reform could finance massive new federal pro-
grams, the answer is "Yes, but most of the money will come from low 
and middle income taxpayers." 
In point of fact, though the Pechman-Okner study of erosion con-
cluded that $77 billion of additional revenue could be raised by 
61. Id. at 26 (table 6). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 36 (table A-5). 
64. Benjamin Okner, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1972, at 32, col. 4. 
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applying today's tax rates to an "uneroded" tax base (aggregate tax-
able income of $644 billion, as against $478 billion under current 
law),65 this was not its principal function. The study focussed, rather, 
on the fact that a comprehensive tax base would permit tax rates to 
be lowered while holding aggregate revenue constant. The statutory 
changes proposed by Pechman and Okner would, of course, distrib-
ute the tax burden differently than existing law even if the total 
amount to be collected is unchanged. Their program would, in 
general, increase the tax burden of homeowners relative to tenants, 
the burden of capital gain recipients relative to recipients of other 
types of income, the burden of persons itemizing their personal 
deductions relative to those using the standard deduction, and the 
burden of married persons relative to unmarried persons. Other 
proposals for a comprehensive tax base would have similar effects, 
except that some reformers are more tolerant than Pechman and 
Okner of the reduced rate granted by existing law to married couples. 
These changes in horizontal equity (i.e., among persons on the 
same income level) would be accompanied by equally important 
changes in vertical equity (i.e., in the burdens borne by taxpayers at 
one income level compared with those at other levels). Because alter-
ations in vertical equity depend upon the rate schedule to be applied 
to the expanded tax base, the possibilities are infinite, ranging from 
an extremely progressive schedule to an extremely regressive one. 
The Pechman-Okner study offers five alternative schedules,66 all of 
which might be described as middle-of-the-road rather than extreme 
proposals. One is a flat rate of 16 per cent of taxable income (as 
newly defined), a proposal that would commend itself to one school 
of tax reform-those who reject progression on ethical grounds or 
because it complicates the tax law and who would substitute a pro-
portional tax on all income above a specified subsistence or modest 
level. This rate schedule would increase the effective tax rate on 
persons with income below $25,000 and greatly reduce the effective 
rate on taxpayers with more than $50,000 of expanded adjusted 
gross income.67 By contrast, the most progressive of the five Pechman-
Okner schedules (which includes a higher initial exemption or low-
income allowance than the others) would reduce the effective rate 
on taxpayers with less than $25,000 of expanded adjusted gross in-
65. Pechman &: Okner, supra note 43, at 24 (table 4). 
66. Id. at 30-33. 
67. Id. at 31 (table 11). "Expanded adjusted gross income" is adjusted gross income 
as defined in section 62 of the Internal Revenue Code modified to include the income 
items listed in Pechman &: Okner, supra note 43, at 23 (table 3). 
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come and increase it for those above the $25,000 level.68 But these 
changes would be marginal rather than revolutionary when judged 
from a macroeconomic perspective. Taxpayers with expanded ad-
justed gross income of $50,000 or more, for example, would pay 
only $2.6 billion (2.5 per cent) more of the $103 billion of income 
tax than under existing law. 69 
v. SELECTIVE TAX REFORM 
Comprehensive tax reform thus turns out to be only mildly re-
distributive if revenue is held constant, while if it is used to raise 
the promised $77 billion of additional revenue by applying the exist• 
ing rate schedule to the expanded tax base, only about 25 per cent 
of the new money would come from families with income above 
$50,000.7° Can social reformers who have been led to believe that the 
systematic elimination of tax "loopholes" is a promising way to re-
distribute income or a bountiful source of financing for major new 
public programs salvage their objectives by abandoning the cause of 
comprehensive reform and concentrating instead on a limited list of 
targets? The most obvious strategy is to eliminate allowances that 
favor high income taxpayers, while allowing taxpayers in more 
modest circumstances to retain their tax shelters. The prime targets 
would be capital gains and such items of "preference income" as 
tax-exempt interest and percentage depletion. Once again, we find 
that the per-family impact of tax reform may be quite substantial, 
but that the aggregate result is not overwhelming. If reform is limited 
to the tax shelters patronized primarily by the rich, the aggregate 
amount of new revenue would be only about $13.4 billion, of which 
$3.4 billion would come from taxpayers with income below $50,000.71 
68. Pechman &: Okner, 'supra note 43, at 31 (table 11 ). 
69. Id. at 26 (table 6), 38 (table A-7). 
70. Id. at 26 (table 6). 
71. The computation is as follows (all dollar amounts, except expanded adjusted 
gross income, in millions): 
Expanded Adjusted Gross Income Class 
Under $50,000 $50,000 &: over Totals 
Maximum tax on earned 
income $ 112 $ 112 
Realized capital gains $1,686 6,355 8,041 
Constructive realization of 
capital gains 1,401 2,324 3,725 
Tax-exempt interest 112 974 1,086 
Accelerated depreciation 
&: depletion 156 268 424 
Totals $3,355 $10,033 $13,388 
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Who are the upper-income taxpayers who would be the principal 
targets of selective tax reform (confined to capital gains, tax-exempt 
interest, and percentage depletion)? The new populists imply that 
the principal beneficiaries of these allowances are "tax millionaires" 
with such familiar names as Ford, Rockefeller, and Mellon-the 
"relative handful of Americans [who] are extravagantly endowed, 
like princes in the Arabian Nights Tales,"72 described in Ferdinand 
Lundberg's 1937 book, America's Sixty Families, and its 1968 sequel, 
The Rich and the Super-Rich. 
But just as analysis of the $77 billion of "tax welfare for the rich" 
distributed by the Internal Revenue Code disclosed that most of this 
amount is received by taxpayers in the middle and lower income 
brackets, so an examination of selective tax reform discloses that you 
don't have to be a Rockefeller to feel its impact. The reform program 
just described would affect about 825 thousand families, composed 
of 2 or 3 million individuals. The inhabitants of these top income 
brackets make up only I or 1.5 per cent of the population, and hence 
can be called a "relative handful," and they surely have more mate-
rial goods than anyone at Haroun-El-Raschid's court. From a politi-
cal perspective, however, it is misleading to imply that a tax reform 
program affecting more than 2 million people is aimed at "America's 
Sixty Families." I am in complete agreement with the objective of 
increasing taxes on this segment of our population, but the attempt 
to portray them as akin to Rockefellers and Fords is bound to be 
counter-productive. 
VI. THE SECOND-ORDER EFFECTS OF TAX REFORM 
This analysis of the "$77 billion welfare program for the rich" 
becomes even more sobering when a fact of life that I have hitherto 
disregarded is taken into account. All of the estimates that I have laid 
before you are derived by simple arithmetic. The Pechman-Okner 
study is based on a representative sample of tax returns, ingeniously 
augmented by estimates of items that are not now reported, to which 
the 1972 rate schedule was applied to estimate the changes in tax 
liability that would result from enlarging the tax base. But when 
items that are not now taxed are multiplied by today's rates, the 
Figures are derived from computation done at Yale University based on the 
Peckman-Okner study; a copy of the computer printout is on file with the Michigan 
Law Review. 
72. F. LUNDllERG, THE RICH AND THE SUPER-RICH l (1969). 
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product is a hypothetical amount that may vary substantially from 
the amount that will actually be due after the taxpayers have ad-
justed their :financial affairs to the new law. 
This is not the place, and I am not the person, to undertake an 
analysis of the second-order consequences of comprehensive tax re-
form. I will simply list some of the factors that would help to create 
a disparity between the estimate of $77 billion of added revenue and 
the amount that might actually be produced by so sweeping a 
program. 
First, if changes in the tax law have effects that are perceived to 
be adverse to activities that are now encouraged by tax incentives, 
Congress may respond by granting subsidies or other non-tax allow-
ances as a substitute for the repealed tax incentives. Thus, some of 
the "new" revenue will simply be diverted to a partial restoration of 
the status quo ante. For example, repeal of the tax immunity of state 
and municipal bond interest is simply not in the cards without a 
substantial federal subsidy to the issuers to reimburse them for the 
higher cost of borrowing. Such a subsidy would absorb a substantial 
part of the new revenue, and, if it were generous enough, could cost 
the Treasury more than taxing the interest would produce.78 Simi-
larly, one can hardly contemplate taxing social security benefits, 
public assistance, unemployment compensation, and some other trans-
fer payments-as proposed by the Pechman-Okner study-without 
using a large part of the "new" revenue to increase these benefits. 
In other cases, the reform could hardly be enacted without offsetting 
tax concessions (e.g., the repeal of income-splitting for married 
couples would unquestionably require an increase in the personal 
and dependency exemptions), which would absorb the "new" reve-
nue to a significant degree. While subsidies in some instances may 
be more equitable and efficient than the tax allowance they dis-
place, 74 the $77 billion for new programs may be as evanescent as the 
"fiscal dividend" that was to be declared when we withdrew from 
Viet Nam. 
73. See Fortune, The Impact of Taxable Municipal Bonds: Policy Simulations with 
a Large Econometric Model, 26 NATL. TAX J. 29 (1973). The Treasury estimated that 
the cost to it of tax exemption in 1968 was $1.8 billion, of which $500 million inured 
to the benefit of high-income individual investors, commercial banks, and casualty 
insurance companies. A private estimate for fiscal 1971 put these amounts at $3.3 
billion and $800 million, respectively. See Hearings on S. 1015 Before the Senate Comm. 
on Banking, Housing c- Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 193, 277 (1972). 
74. See Surrey, supra note 3. 
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Second, the additional yield will be offset to some extent by 
revenue reductions in later years when the new structure has reached 
a "steady state." Thus, the denial of accelerated depreciation and of 
the deduction for intangible drilling and development expenses in 
the year of payment will increase the taxpayer's deductions in later 
years (e.g., for "dry holes" and losses when the property becomes 
worthless dr is sold for less than its adjusted basis). These offsets are 
likely to be of more importance to high income than low income 
taxpayers. 
Third, some taxpayers will shift to tax avoidance tactics that are 
not prohibited even by the comprehensive reform program, such as 
the deferral of earned income to later years, intra-family transfers of 
property, and investments in growth stocks and real property. The 
reader may be inclined to reject this suggestion, believing that Con-
gress could be induced to define "income" in such sweeping terms 
as to outlaw all tax avoidance devices.76 He would do well to 
remember the Duke of Wellington's response when an otherwise 
forgotten person accosted him in Hyde Park with the salutation, 
"Mr. Smith, I believe?" The Duke's reply: "If you believe that, you'll 
believe anything." 
Fourth, major changes in the tax structure are bound to have 
an impact, however obscure and difficult to measure, on the tax-
payer's economic choices-such as between work and leisure, be-
tween investment and consumption, between risky and safe enter-
prises-that will affect his pre-tax income, and therefore his tax 
liability. 
Fifth, these changes in each individual taxpayer's economic be-
havior will alter the price of goods and services for other taxpayers 
who, in turn, will respond by changing their economic behavior; 
these decisions will alter their pre-tax income, and hence their tax 
liabilities. 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In concluding this analysis, I should like to look once more at the 
"$77 billion welfare program for the rich," this time from the per-
spective of the tax reform proposals offered to the electorate by Sena-
75. On the extent to which even the most dedicated and enthusiastic advocates of 
the broad Haig-Simons definition of "income" disagree about its application in practice, 
see Bittker, supra note 39. 
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tor McGovern during the 1972 campaign. During the Democratic 
primaries, Senator McGovern espoused a plan that, for the first time 
in American history, would have brought rich and poor together into 
a single comprehensive program to tax persons above a specified 
break-even point and pay benefits to those below it. There were 
several versions of the plan, but the one that caught the popular 
imagination called for a "demogrant" of $1,000 per person as assured 
income maintenance, to be paid in cash to those at the bottom of the 
ladder, reduced gradually for those at low and modest income levels 
by the amount of tax on their outside income, and credited against 
the tax liability of those with higher incomes.76 
This integration of "positive taxes" with public assistance ("nega-
tive taxes") had many adherents in academic circles, uniting econo-
mists of such diverse political convictions as Milton Friedman and 
James Tobin,77 but the idea was unknown in the outside world. 
Lacking an infrastructure of public information and journalistic 
support, which could not possibly be supplied in the superheated 
haste of a primary campaign, the "demogrant" proposal quickly 
collapsed under stress. The reasons need not be recited here, save as 
they illuminate the main themes of this Article. 
When first advanced by Senator McGovern, the $1,000 tax credit 
proposal seemed to offer a way to redistribute income on a significant 
scale by taxing only the very rich, and thus to respond to such 
slogans as "take the rich off welfare." But a careful reading of Senator 
McGovern's own statement would have disclosed that "about 20 per 
cent of Federal taxpayers would experience a tax increase"78-an 
estimate that was later revised upward to embrace about 90 million 
individuals, 79 only a few of whom are named J. Paul Getty. More-
over, under the original McGovern plan a tax increase would be 
experienced by a single person with income of $2,000 or more and a 
married couple without children if their income was $4,000 or more. 
Families with two or more children fared better under the plan, 
and its supporters pointed out that a family of four would pay less 
than under existing law unless its income exceeded $20,000. It was 
impossible to focus solely on this idyllic and authentic American 
76. McGovern, Tax Reform and Redistribution of Income, 118 CONG. R.Ec. S5626, 
S5628 (daily ed. April 7, 1972), reprinted in N.Y. R.Ev. OF BooKS, May 4, 1972, at 7, 10. 
77. See C. GREEN, NEGATIVE TAXES AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM 57-61 (1967). 
78. McGovern, supra note 76, at S5628, reprinted at 10. 
79. Calculations made at Yale University. 
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group, however, because in the California Democratic primary Sena-
tor Humphrey quickly made himself the standard-bearer for other 
American life styles. He exploited the plan's bias against unmarried 
persons and childless couples, asserting that it would produce a 50 
per cent increase (from $1,100 to $1,666) in the federal income tax 
liability of an $8,000-per-year unmarried secretary living in San Fran-
cisco80-a homely geographical touch that could have been amended 
to fit every city and hamlet in the nation. The charge, unconvincingly 
denied by Senator McGovern, was devastating; it would have been 
even more deadly if Senator Humphrey had had access to the compu-
ter printouts on the plan,81 showing an aggregate reduction of $100 
million in taxes for families with income of $1 million or more and 
scattered reductions for many other high income taxpayers, attrib-
utable to the fact that the proposed top tax rate was 48 per cent. 
Though Senator McGovern won the California primary, his nar-
row margin in a state that had been expected to give him a smashing 
victory was blamed in large part on the tax plan, which then went 
back to the technicians for revision. The intolerable bias against 
single persons and childless couples could be mitigated by changing 
the "demogrant" from a flat amount of $1,000 per person and by dis-
tinguishing between adults and children (e.g., $1,320 for the first one 
or nvo adults in a family, and $500 for each child), but this change 
meant that many welfare families would be left below the poverty 
line and would get less in 1975-the target date for a full employ-
ment economy-than their I 972 welfare payments, especially if the 
mother was the only adult.82 Moreover, this version of the plan was 
no more financed by the rich and the super-rich than was its pre-
decessor. Almost one half of the nation's families, comprising more 
than a third of the population, would have paid more taxes than 
under existing law. 
Once these deficiencies, along with others that need not be 
detailed here, were digested by Senator McGovern's advisers, the 
"demogrant" proposal was abandoned, and an orthodox tax reform 
program was substituted. It was limited to attacking such old favor-
ites as long-term capital gains, percentage depletion, and accelerated 
80. Washington Post, May 29, 1972, § A, at 12, col. 1. 
81. Calculations made at Yale University. 
82. Retired persons living on social security benefits and homeowners also presented 
problems, for which McGovern's advisers sought to provide remedies that were not 
included in the original plan. 
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depreciation, and the pill was sugar-coated with a proposed reduc-
tion of the maximum tax rate from 70 to 48 per cent. The target was 
$12.6 billion of added revenue from the individual income tax88-
well under 20 per cent of the legendary $77 billion of tax welfare 
dispensed by existing law. By the time this plan was disclosed, how-
ever, the election was only two months off and, as we now know, 
victory for Senator McGovern was not at hand. In accepting the 
Republican nomination just a week before the revised McGovern 
tax plan was unveiled, President Nixon said that the original plan 
would add 82 million people to the welfare rolls. 84 He could have 
offered no more ironic an obituary to the "demogrant" proposal, 
which had been intended to bar the demeaning term "welfare" . by 
bringing rich and poor together. The President simultaneously 
demonstrated that the term "welfare" as a label for tax allowances 
was a two-edged sword, tendered to him by a political opposition that 
did not realize which edge was sharper. We are still hearing rever-
berations of this tactical reversal. John D. Ehrlichman, former assis-
tant to the President, has asserted that comprehensive tax reform 
means that "you don't let the average householder deduct the interest 
on his mortgage anymore, and you don't let him deduct charitable 
contributions to his church or to the Boy Scouts."85 It is hard to de-
flate rhetoric of this type if one has been proclaiming that the deduc-
tions allowed by current law for local property taxes, interest on 
home mortgages, and charitable contributions are integral parts of a 
$77 billion welfare program for the rich and the super-rich. 
Despite this painful history, I am convinced that a comprehensive 
income-maintenance program, integrated with the federal income tax 
system, should be high on our national agenda. But the technical 
foundation for such an integrated program has only begun to be laid, 
and public acceptance of its cost is even further in the future. Macro-
economic estimates, in which a hundred million dollars is the small-
est unit of calculation, are easily made, but the fiasco just described 
83. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1972, at I, col. 8, at 22, cols. 4-5. 
84. N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1972, at 47, cols. 2-3. The estimated 82 million "on welfare" 
were evidently those who would receive some cash, however small the amount. If the 
President had accepted the broader theory of "tax expenditures" or "implicit grants" 
espoused by some tax theorists (Pfaff, supra note 3, Heller, supra note 3, Surrey, supra 
note 3), he could have said that the entire population, not merely 82 million people, 
would be on the welfare rolls. See McGovern, supra note 76, at S5628, reprinted at IO. 
("I propose that every man, woman and child receive from the federal government an 
annual payment.") 
85. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1973, at 30, col. 2. 
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shows that more is required than impeccable arithmetic. We must 
be clear about the effect of the program on the unmarried secretary, 
the policeman who moonlights as a taxi driver, the salesman who is 
married to a school teacher, the retired pharmacist living on social 
security, and so on. The technician may wish to drown these cases 
in a sea of averages, dismissing each inconvenient instance as idio-
syncratic, but sooner or later the facts must be disclosed. 
Of these facts, the most difficult to face is that the income pyramid 
gets narrower as it gets higher. The rich and the super-rich at the top 
make a convenient target for rhetoric, but most of the money is to 
to be found at lower levels. It is a counter-productive hoax to encour-
age the belief that $77 billion can be raised by "taking the rich off 
welfare," if the term "rich" is to have the meaning ascribed to it by 
the audience to which this slogan is addressed. 
In conclusion, the time has come to rescue the federal income tax 
from the superheated rhetoric of its populist friends. By denouncing 
it as a web of "loopholes," "organized larceny," a vast and uncon-
trolled program of "back-door spending," and a pork barrel of 
"upside-down subsidies," they threaten to persuade wage earners 
and other low and middle income taxpayers that the income tax is 
the worst of all possible taxes, while leaving its competitors-state 
sales taxes, local property taxes, and value-added taxation-stronger 
by comparison. By indiscriminately lumping together percentage 
depletion, income-splitting for married couples, the exemption of 
state and municipal bond interest, the extra $750 exemption for the 
blind, accelerated depreciation, the exemption of social security 
payments, and so on, they imply that these features of existing law 
are equally objectionable, and that a tax reform proposal is a craven 
surrender to vested interests if it does not eradicate all of them 
simultaneously. 
This implication cannot be-faulted if it is what the populist critics 
of the existing law really mean. But for those who believe, as I do 
(and as I suspect the new populists, for all their rhetoric, do), that 
these "loopholes" can be ranged in a hierarchy-from offensive, 
through debatable and trivial, to justified-and that we would do 
well to pick and choose among them, the rhetoric I have described 
undermines rather than supports the cause of tax reform. If $77 
billion of new revenue comes to be the popular measure of serious 
tax reform, the revenue impact of any feasible program of selective 
reform is bound to be disappointing, even if it concentrates on 
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capital gains, tax-exempt interest, accelerated depreciation, percen-
tage depletion, and similar high-income provisions. In my view, 
therefore, the time has come for a drastic revision of the rhetoric of 
tax reform. 
